Scalia\u27s Infidelity: A Critique of  Faint-Hearted  Originalism by Barnett, Randy E
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2006 
Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism 
Randy E. Barnett 
Georgetown University Law Center, rb325@law.georgetown.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 880112 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/841 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=880112 
 
75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 7-24 (2006) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Judges Commons 
G-BARNETT 11/29/2006 5:00:51 PM 
 
7 
SCALIA’S INFIDELITY: 
A CRITIQUE OF “FAINT-HEARTED” ORIGINALISM 
Randy E. Barnett∗ 
In this essay, based on the 2006 William Howard Taft Lecture, I 
critically evaluate Justice Antonin Scalia’s famous and influential 
1988 Taft Lecture, entitled Originalism: The Lesser Evil.  In his 
lecture, Justice Scalia began the now-widely-accepted shift from 
basing constitutional interpretation on the intent of the framers to 
relying instead on the original public meaning of the text.  At the same 
time, I explain how Justice Scalia allows himself three ways to escape 
originalist results that he finds to be objectionable: (1) when the text 
is insufficiently rule-like, (2) when precedent has deviated from 
original meaning and (3) when the first two justifications are 
unavailing, just ignore originalism to avoid sufficiently objectionable 
results.  While Justice Scalia describes his approach as “faint-hearted 
originalism,” I contend that he is not really an originalist at all as 
evidenced by this lecture and also by his stances as a Justice in 
several important cases.  This leaves Justice Thomas as the only 
Justice who seems at all bound by originalist conclusions with which 
he may disagree.  I then summarize why the courts ought to adhere to 
original public meaning originalism, why this form of originalism is 
preferable to the principal alternative—which I call the “underlying 
principles” approach—and why originalism, properly understood, 
does not lead to the types of grossly objectionable results that leads 
Justice Scalia to be faint of heart. 
 
I am deeply honored to be invited to give the 2006 William Howard 
Taft Lecture.  It is an honor to stand here in the footsteps of such 
distinguished previous lecturers as Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and 
Antonin Scalia, Senators Orrin Hatch and Alan Simpson, Judges Patricia 
Wald and Ken Starr, university presidents Benno Schmidt and Lee 
Bollinger, and super-luminary law professors Pam Karlan and Akhil 
Amar.  And it is also an honor to give a lecture dedicated to the memory 
of William Howard Taft, whom Justice Scalia aptly described as 
 
 ∗ Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center.  
Permission to photocopy for classroom use is hereby granted.  This paper was presented as the 2006 
William Howard Taft Lecture at the University of Cincinnati College of Law on February 2, 2006. 
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an extraordinary man by any standard.  A state trial judge at twenty-nine, 
Solicitor General of the United States at thirty-two, a United States 
Circuit Judge at thirty-four, Professor and Dean at the University of 
Cincinnati Law School, High Commissioner of the Philippines, Secretary 
of War, President of the United States, and Chief Justice of the United 
States.1 
While I am certainly far more sympathetic with Taft’s efforts as Chief 
Justice to hold Congress to its enumerated powers than are most law 
professors, this will not be the focus of my remarks.  At least not 
directly.2 
JUSTICE SCALIA’S TAFT LECTURE 
Instead, I wish to take as my subject Justice Scalia’s 1988 Taft 
Lecture, Originalism: The Lesser Evil.  The published version of this 
lecture in the University of Cincinnati Law Review has had an enormous 
influence.  It is among the most frequently cited law review articles3 
and—together with Justice Scalia’s introduction to A Matter of 
Interpretation4—helped shape the current debate over the proper method 
of constitutional interpretation.  Indeed, his Taft Lecture can be credited 
with contributing to one of the most remarkable intellectual comeback 
stories of legal scholarship. 
In the 1980s various leading figures in constitutional law took aim at 
the contention that the Constitution should be interpreted according to 
the original intentions of its framers.  Originalism, it was widely 
thought, was thoroughly trounced by three unanswerable objections: 
First, originalism is impractical because it is impossible to discover and 
aggregate the various intentions held by numerous framers.5  Second, 
originalism is actually contrary to the original intentions of the founding 
generation who themselves rejected reliance on original intent.6  Finally, 
originalism is to be rejected because it is wrong for the living to be 
bound by the dead hand of the past. 
 
 1. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
 2. Adopting an original meaning method of interpretation would justify holding Congress to its 
enumerated powers, as Chief Justice Taft favored. 
 3. It is cited in 462 law review articles. 
 4. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3 (Antonin 
Scalia & Amy Gutmann, eds., 1998). 
 5. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204 (1980). 
 6. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885 (1985). 
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In his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia was perhaps the first defender of 
originalism to shift the theory from its previous focus on the intentions 
of the framers of the Constitution to the original public meaning of the 
text at the time of its enactment.7  This shift from original framers intent 
to original public meaning obviated much of the practical objection to 
originalism.8  That language has an accessible public meaning is what 
enables interpersonal communication.  If words did not have an 
objective meaning beyond the subjective intention of speakers and 
writers, we would never be able to understand each other.  Indeed, the 
objective theory by which private contracts are normally interpreted 
assumes the availability of such meaning.  And the very same evidence 
that shows the founding generation rejecting reliance on the intentions of 
the framers also shows their reliance on the original public meaning of 
the text. 
Shifting from original framers intent to original public meaning did 
little to answer the “dead hand” objection, however.  Why be bound by 
the past?  For that, Justice Scalia and other originalists had to develop a 
theory of constitutional legitimacy.  Most originalists stressed the theory 
of popular sovereignty.  They contended that the Constitution is an 
authoritative expression of the will of the People, which judges are duty-
bound to follow.  While some originalists may have thought this theory 
justified adhering to the original intent of the framers, most quickly saw 
that the relevant authority to be obeyed were the ratifiers rather than the 
framers of the Constitution. 
The theory that constitutions obtain their legitimacy from the consent 
of the governed is widely held.  It is favored by most on the left as well 
as on the right, as evidenced from the title of Bruce Ackerman’s books, 
We the People,9 as well as the substance of Taft Lecturer Akhil Amar’s 
book, The Bill of Rights.10  Also in this camp is the “popular 
constitutionalism” of Mark Tushnet’s, Taking the Constitution Away 
from the Courts,11 and Larry Kramer’s, The People Themselves.12  In all 
 
 7. This is the term he (almost) consistently uses in his Taft Lecture.  (For an exception see infra 
text accompanying note 35.)  He defends this choice in Scalia, supra note 4, at 38 (“What I look for in 
the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the 
original draftsmen intended.”). 
 8. This and the next two paragraphs summarize the argument presented in Parts I & II of 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 1–131 
(2004). 
 9. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
 10. See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998). 
 11. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 12. See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2006). 
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of these books, however, the theory of popular sovereignty is simply 
assumed rather then defended. 
I won’t attempt a detailed refutation of the popular sovereignty theory 
of constitutional legitimacy here, something I do provide in Restoring 
the Lost Constitution.13  The basic problem is that, while the theory is 
founded on the consent of the governed, consent morally binds only 
those who themselves actually consent.  No one has yet explained how 
the consent of some of our ancient ancestors, and in my case someone 
else’s ancestors—or for that matter the consent of only some today—can 
bind those alive today who have not consented.  The attempt to show 
how some can consent for others is the constitutional theory equivalent 
of squaring the circle, or perhaps a perpetual motion machine would be 
an even more apt analogy.  No matter how well it outwardly seems to 
run, the insides of any such theory inevitably involve some form of 
cheat. 
In his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia did not emphasize the theory of 
popular sovereignty but offered a theory of legitimacy grounded in the 
role of the judiciary.  Here is how he put the point: 
The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism, in my view, is its 
incompatibility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of 
constitutionality. . . . [T]he Constitution, though it has an effect superior 
to other laws, is in its nature the sort of “law” that is the business of the 
courts—an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the 
usual devices familiar to those learned in the law.  If the Constitution 
were not that sort of a “law,” but a novel invitation to apply current 
societal values, what reason would there be to believe that the invitation 
was addressed to the courts rather than to the legislature?  One simply 
cannot say, regarding that sort of novel enactment, that “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department” to 
determine its content.  Quite to the contrary, the legislature would seem a 
much more appropriate expositor of social values, and its determination 
that a statute is compatible with the Constitution should, as in England, 
prevail.14 
According to this argument, originalism is based on the proper role of 
courts as “law followers” so the Constitution, as law, must be something 
that can be followed as opposed to invented or made up.  The latter role 
we normally associate with the legislature.  And the only way the 
Constitution provides “law” to be followed is if it is viewed as an 
authoritative command with a discernable public meaning at the time of 
its enactment. 
 
 13. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 11–31. 
 14. Scalia, supra note 1, at 854. 
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While I think the idea of viewing the Constitution as “law” is 
promising—and I will offer my own take on this later—there are two 
problems with Justice Scalia’s account.  First, it begs the question of the 
Constitution’s legitimacy, focusing instead on the legitimacy of judicial 
review within our (assumedly legitimate) constitutional system.  Even 
where the text of the Constitution contains clear law-like commands, the 
dead hand argument questions whether we the living are to be bound by 
the commands of the dead, however clear they may be.  Scalia’s account 
offers no rejoinder, but I cannot fault him too much for this.  After all, 
very few constitutional scholars have presented an explicit theory of 
what makes a constitution binding on the living.15  Most prefer to 
silently assume it is, articulating something like a consent of the 
governed approach based on some notion of assent by today’s popular 
majority when forced to confront the issue.16 
Still, I cannot critique a theory that Justice Scalia did not articulate, so 
I proceed to another difficulty with his normative defense of originalism: 
Justice Scalia’s approach would seem to justify judicial enforcement of 
only those passages of the Constitution that are sufficiently rule-like to 
constitute a determinate command that a judge can simply follow.  The 
more general or abstract provisions of the Constitution are hardly rules 
that fit this description, so should judges ignore them? 
It turns out that, with respect to the Ninth Amendment, for example, 
this is precisely the view later adopted by Justice Scalia himself.  In the 
case of Troxel v. Granville,17 he dismissed the unenumerated rights 
“retained by the people” to which the Ninth Amendment expressly refers 
as subject only to the protection of majorities in legislative bodies.18  But 
this puts him in an awkward position.  According to his argument, 
judges must decide for themselves which clauses meet his standard of a 
rule of law and which do not, because only the former merit judicial 
protection.  By this route, large portions of the Constitution become 
nonjusticiable by judicial fiat.  For example, all unenumerated rights 
become judicially unenforceable, which certainly results in their being 
“disparaged” or “denied”—exactly how the Ninth Amendment says the 
Constitution is not to be construed.  Also banished from the courts 
would be much of the Fourteenth Amendment, and who knows what 
other more abstract provisions. 
 
 
 15. For an exception, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1787 (2005). 
 16. See supra text accompanying notes 9–12. 
 17. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 18. Id. at 91–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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No doubt, Justice Scalia would condemn those many constitutional 
law professors who would urge courts to ignore the original meaning of 
the Constitution where doing so conflicts with their conception of 
“justice.”  But Justice Scalia himself commits the comparable sin of 
ignoring the original meaning of those portions of the Constitution that 
conflict with his conception of “the rule of law as a law of rules.”19  
Discarding those provisions that do not meet with one’s approval hardly 
seems like what we would call “fidelity” to a written constitution. 
Justice Scalia’s infidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution 
as a whole manifests itself in another way in his Taft Lecture.  To the 
objection that originalism “[i]n its undiluted form, at least, . . . is 
medicine that seems too strong to swallow,”20 he offers two responses.  
First, he asserts a strong role for precedent, even where it is inconsistent 
with the original meaning of the text: “Thus, almost every originalist 
would adulterate it with the doctrine of stare decisis,” he admitted, “so 
that Marbury v. Madison would stand even if Professor Raoul Berger 
should demonstrate unassailably that it got the meaning of the 
Constitution wrong.”21  Notice that, contrary to his professed skepticism 
about the legitimacy of judicial review, this stance puts prior opinions of 
mere judges above that of the Constitution.  Why?  Simply because the 
results of doing otherwise seem to him too objectionable to countenance. 
Even adherence to stare decisis, however, is inadequate to escape the 
objectionable results that Justice Scalia thinks stems from a fearless 
adherence to original meaning. 
But stare decisis alone is not enough to prevent originalism from being 
what many would consider too bitter a pill.  What if some state should 
enact a new law providing public lashing, or branding of the right hand, 
as punishment for certain criminal offenses?  Even if it could be 
demonstrated unequivocally that these were not cruel and unusual 
measures in 1791, and even though no prior Supreme Court decision has 
specifically disapproved them, I doubt whether any federal judge—even 
among the many who consider themselves originalists—would sustain 
them against an eighth amendment challenge.22 
So what does Justice Scalia say an originalist judge should do in the 
face of such objectionable results?  Punt.  In perhaps the most famous 
passage of his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia describes himself as a “faint-
hearted originalist.”  In his words, “I hasten to confess that in a crunch I 
 
 19. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175–81 
(1989). 
 20. Scalia, supra note 1, at 861. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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may prove a faint-hearted originalist.  I cannot imagine myself, any 
more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the 
punishment of flogging.”23  Indeed, he thinks, it is 
the fact that most originalists are faint-hearted and most nonoriginalists 
are moderate (that is, would not ascribe evolving content to such clear 
provisions as the requirement that the President be no less than thirty-five 
years of age) which accounts for the fact that the sharp divergence 
between the two philosophies does not produce an equivalently sharp 
divergence in judicial opinions.24 
IS JUSTICE SCALIA AN ORIGINALIST? 
On his account of the proper approach to interpreting the 
Constitution, then, Justice Scalia proves unfaithful to the original 
meaning of the text in three distinct ways.  First, he is willing to ignore 
the original meaning of those portions of the Constitution that do not 
meet his criteria of the rule of law as the law of rules.  Second, he is 
willing to avoid objectionable outcomes that would result from 
originalism by invoking the precedents established by the dead hand of 
nonoriginalist justices.  Third, where precedent is unavailing as an 
escape route, he is willing simply to abandon originalist results that he 
and most others would find too onerous by some unstated criteria. 
Does Justice Scalia’s faint-hearted fidelity to the original meaning of 
the Constitution not represent something of a refutation of originalism 
itself.  Others have surely drawn this lesson both from Justice Scalia’s 
Taft Lecture and from the way he practices originalism as a Justice.  
And why shouldn’t they?  After all, if so lion-hearted a jurist as he 
shrinks in practice from the implications of a theory he so vociferously 
defends, is this not pretty strong evidence that originalism itself ought to 
be rejected as unworkable and ultimately unwise? 
I think not.  Instead, I would conclude from his Taft Lecture and his 
behavior on the Court that Justice Scalia is simply not an originalist.  
Whatever virtues he attributes to originalism, he leaves himself not one 
but three different routes by which to escape adhering to the original 
meaning of the text.  These are more than enough to allow him, or any 
judge, to reach any result he wishes.  Where originalism gives him the 
results he wants, he can embrace originalism.  Where it does not, he can 
embrace precedent that will.  Where friendly precedent is unavailing, he 
can assert the nonjusticiability of clauses that yield results to which he is 
 
 23. Id. at 864. 
 24. Id. at 862. 
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opposed.  And where all else fails, he can simply punt, perhaps citing the 
history of traditionally-accepted practices of which he approves. 
For those who may still doubt Justice Scalia’s lack of fidelity to 
originalism, I cite three examples.  The first is his stance in the famous 
case of United States v. Lopez25 in which the Court held the Gun Free 
School Zones Act unconstitutional because it exceeded the powers of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause.  In this case, although Chief 
Justice Rehnquist based his opinion for the Court on “first principles,”26 
he also expended considerable effort to reconcile the result in Lopez 
with the Court’s post-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  In 
contrast, Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion urging the Court 
to reconsider its post-New Deal interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
in light of its original meaning.27 
I think it is telling that, in Lopez, Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion of the Court but did not join the originalist 
concurring opinion of Justice Thomas.  This refusal is all the more 
remarkable because Justice Scalia obviously agreed with the outcome of 
an originalist analysis in the case at hand.  We can only guess at why 
Justice Scalia avoided noting his agreement with Justice Thomas’s 
originalist analysis.  Future events I shall describe in a moment, 
however, suggest that he may well have foreseen the day when he would 
not approve of the results of an originalist analysis, so he declined to 
endorse them when he did.  And one virtue of originalism is that such 
results are often not hard to predict. 
My second example of Justice Scalia’s infidelity to originalism is 
very much like the first.  In Kelo v. New London,28 in which the Court 
upheld the use of eminent domain to take private property for the use of 
a private developer, Justice Scalia joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent.29  
Once again he chose not to join the explicitly originalist dissenting 
opinion of Justice Thomas.30  This choice is another example of Justice 
Scalia’s refusal to endorse an originalist justification of a result with 
which he agrees. 
My final example is quite different.  In the medical cannabis case of 
Gonzales v. Raich31, which I argued in the Supreme Court two terms 
 
 25. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 26. Id. at 552 (“The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”). 
 27. See id. at 584–602 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 28. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 29. See id. at 2671–2677 (joining O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 2229–2239 (Thomas, J. dissenting).  I am not here asserting that Justice Thomas’s 
originalist analysis of the Takings Clause in Kelo is correct, but that it was incumbent on a truly 
originalist Justice either to agree or to explain the originalist basis for his disagreement. 
 31. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
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ago, Justice Scalia joined the majority of the Court in upholding the 
application of the Controlled Substances Act to persons who grow 
cannabis on their own property solely for their own medical use as 
recommended by their physicians and authorized by state law.32  Unlike 
Lopez and Kelo, in Raich Justice Scalia was on the opposite side of the 
case from Justice Thomas, who filed an impassioned originalist dissent.  
Unlike the previous cases where he silently joined the nonoriginalist 
opinions of others without telling us why he rejected Justice Thomas’s 
originalist analysis, this time he filed his own concurring opinion in 
which he stressed his reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause.33  
While there is much I could say about the position he articulates in 
Raich, most pertinent for present purposes was Justice Scalia’s complete 
refusal to confront and refute Justice Thomas’s originalist analysis, 
something it would seem incumbent on a justice truly committed to 
originalism to do. 
I think these three examples reveal that, if any current justice can 
fairly be described as a committed originalist, it is Justice Thomas and 
not Justice Scalia.  But this would surprise no one who read Justice 
Scalia’s Taft Lecture.  Any judge who leaves himself not one, but three 
different avenues by which to abandon original meaning can hardly be 
viewed as committed to the methodology.  And indeed, his judicial 
stances reveal that he is not, as does his distancing himself from Justice 
Thomas’s willingness to reconsider precedents that are inconsistent with 
original meaning.34 
At this point, I could speculate about what Justice Scalia is committed 
to, if not to originalism.  My guess is that it is some mixture of 
democratic majoritarianism, judicial restraint, and acceptable policy 
outcomes, but such a claim would be hard to establish, and I shall not 
try.  Instead, in the final portion of my remarks, I wish to return to the 
challenge to which I earlier alluded: If someone so stout-hearted and 
disputatious as Justice Scalia cannot stick with originalism when it 
pinches, does this not strongly suggest that the fault lies not with him 
but with originalism itself? 
Of course, if Justice Scalia, like professed nonoriginalists, is actually 
committed to other values or objectives above originalism, he may well 
assert the difficulties of originalism as a means of pursuing these other 
 
 32. Id. at 2215–2220 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 33. Id at 2215–2220 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 34. Justice Scalia has been quoted as saying that Justice Thomas “doesn’t believe in stare 
decisis, period. . . . [I]f a constitutional line of authority is wrong, [Thomas] would say, ‘Let’s get it 
right.’ I wouldn’t do that.”  As quoted by Ken Foskett in Douglas T. Kendall, A Big Question About 
Clarence Thomas, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2004, at A31. 
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values, as nonoriginalists do.  If so, the only thing distinguishing him 
from nonoriginalists is his admission that originalism is the most 
defensible method of interpretation.  Indeed, he notes in his Taft Lecture 
the similarity in all but name between his faint-hearted originalism and 
moderate nonoriginalism.35 
If we take his reservations about a fearless originalism at a face value, 
however, we can separately assess two distinct problems for originalism 
raised by Justice Scalia’s infidelity.  The first is his willingness to 
abandon the text where it is insufficiently rule-like to be properly 
enforced by judges.  The second is his willingness to abandon 
originalism when it leads to untenable results. 
Justice Scalia’s willingness to enforce only those portions of the text 
that he finds sufficiently rule-like is based on his claim that judicial 
review is warranted only when judges are doing lawyerly tasks like 
interpreting rules.  When something like a policy judgment is required, 
that judgment is properly left to the legislature, as is the application of 
more abstract constitutional requirements to the laws they enact.  In 
other words, we leave it to the legislatures to decide how and whether to 
adhere to the more abstract provisions of the text.  Judges must stick to 
their rule-following knitting.  But this position is based on a largely 
unspecified and highly under-theorized view of constitutional legitimacy 
in general and judicial review in particular. 
A CRITIQUE OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S FAINT-HEARTED ORIGINALISM 
Let me now sketch an alternative that I have elaborated at greater 
length elsewhere.36  As already noted, in my book Restoring the Lost 
Constitution, I reject the idea of popular sovereignty or the “consent of 
the governed” as any support for a constitution of a polity such as the 
United States.  While unanimous consent to governance is quite possible 
and common—all of you who are students or faculty at the University of 
Cincinnati have done so—it is a fiction to think that such unanimous 
consent exists, or has ever existed, at the national level.  While some 
may consent, others surely do not, and mere acquiescence to prevailing 
government does not constitute consent.  I will not pursue this claim 
here.  Instead, I wish to describe the alternative route to constitutional 
legitimacy I defend in my book. 
The challenge is to establish legitimate governance of those who have 
not consented.  I contend that such governance is warranted, even in the 
 
 35. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 862. 
 36. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 32–52. 
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absence of consent, (a) if the rights of those on whom it is imposed 
coercively have not been violated and (b) if such coercion is needed to 
protect the rights of others, which all have a duty to respect regardless of 
whether they consent to do so.  In other words, no one can complain 
about a particular legal regime if their rights have not been violated; and 
they are obligated to obey rules that are necessary to protect the rights of 
others. 
Put another way, nonconsensual legal regime is legitimate if it 
follows procedures that assure the laws it imposes on a nonconsenting 
public are both necessary to protect the rights of others and proper 
insofar as they do not violate the rights of those on whom they are 
imposed.  By “legitimate,” I mean that the regime is capable of 
producing laws that are entitled to a prima facie duty of obedience.  
Laws made according to such procedures are entitled to a benefit of the 
doubt. 
At this juncture, I ask you to set aside your doubts about both my 
critiques of popular sovereignty and the theory of legitimacy I offer as 
an alternative to it.  Be assured that I address objections to both stances 
elsewhere.  Assume for the sake of argument that there exists this 
alternative nonconsensual route to legitimacy based on the respect for 
individual rights.  If established, what implications would this 
alternative basis for constitutional legitimacy have for constitutional 
interpretation? 
To begin, in the absence of consent, the legitimacy of a constitutional 
regime should be assessed by how well it protects individual rights.  
Does following a particular constitution when enacting laws make it 
more likely than not that such laws do not violate rights and are 
necessary to protect the rights of others?  To answer this question 
requires an assessment of both the substance and procedural features of 
a particular constitutional order.  Such an assessment would need to 
decide whether a system that combines elements of federalism, 
separation of powers, a bifurcated legislature, a presidential veto power 
subject to a supermajoritarian override, judicial review, enumerated and 
limited powers, and an explicit but limited bill of rights provides 
confidence that lawful commands emerging from such a system are so 
likely to respect rights that they merit the benefit of the doubt.  I won’t 
address this complex question here, but I hope you can see both the 
nature of such an inquiry, and how it differs from worrying about 
whether a particular constitutional regime was consented to by some or 
all of those upon whom is it coercively imposed. 
The second step in discerning the implications of this route to 
legitimacy for constitutional interpretation is to note that a written 
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constitution is one more structural feature of our constitutional order in 
addition to those I just listed.  Why put a constitution in writing?  There 
are at least two good reasons for doing so.  First, because it helps “lock 
in” all the other legitimacy-enhancing features of a constitution I have 
already described.  If you want to preserve a constitutional order that is 
legitimate because it has certain procedural features that ensure the 
protection of rights, then to prevent degeneration into an illegitimate 
system, we want these procedures to be put in writing. 
When the presidential veto power is put in writing, for example, 
denying or disparaging that power becomes much harder.  Students, ask 
yourselves why you would want your professors to put their attendance 
policy in writing, and you will begin to see why the “lock-in” function 
of a written constitution is legitimacy enhancing.  Second, a written 
constitution was devised as a means to impose law on those who impose 
laws on the governed.  In other words, it was way to impose law on law-
makers, interpreters, and enforcers.  Such a law is meant to restrict the 
exercise of law-making to actions that respect the rights retained by the 
people. 
But a written constitution can perform neither the “lock-in” or rights-
protecting functions if those who are supposed to be bound and limited 
by its terms may alter their meaning at their discretion—especially when 
these changes systematically expand the powers of law-makers.  What it 
means to bind those who make, interpret and enforce the laws, is that 
they may not rewrite the laws that bind them.  For this reason, the 
meaning of the Constitution must remain the same until it is properly 
changed; and it is as improper for those upon whom the restraints of the 
Constitution are imposed to alter its meaning—whether alone or in 
combination with other branches—as it is for you or I to alter the laws 
that bind us. 
The principle that “the meaning of the Constitution shall remain the 
same until it is properly changed,” is simply another way of describing 
original meaning originalism.  Because those who are to be governed by 
the law of the Constitution may not change it in their own, the founders 
provided alternate institutions—either state legislatures or state 
conventions—who must concur in any changes.  To summarize, for a 
written constitution to perform its legitimacy-enhancing function, judges 
cannot alter the meaning of the written Constitution they swear an oath 
to uphold.  That would be like taking an oath “to preserve protect and 
defend what I think the Constitution ought to say.”  That is hardly an 
oath of fidelity at all.  It is like crossing one’s fingers when making a 
promise. 
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This route to legitimacy in the absence of consent explains why 
adherence to a written constitution contributes to legitimacy by limiting 
the proper powers of those who impose laws on the nonconsenting 
people and why the meaning of such a writing should remain the same 
until properly changed.  It also explains why all the limits on the powers 
of government by which rights are protected should be enforceable, not 
merely the ones that look like rules.  Judicial review of legislation 
provides an important means by which legislatures can be held to their 
proper powers.  If judges decline to enforce these limits, then all we 
have is trust in the discretion of legislatures to stay within them.  But if 
we could trust legislatures to this degree to protect the rights retained by 
the people, we would have no need for a written constitution, indeed for 
any constitution. 
I maintain that the enterprise of constitutionalism is based, in whole 
or in part, on a basic distrust that government will stay within its proper 
role of protecting and respecting the rights of the people.  If this distrust 
is unwarranted, then we can do without a written constitution altogether.  
I think many who reject originalism would favor this option.  On both 
the political left and right you find the belief that majoritarian voting is 
sufficient to protect the rights of the people.  Or at least they believe this 
when their side is in power.  The founders personally experienced a 
purely majoritarian system in their post-revolutionary states and rejected 
it.  Perhaps the founders were wrong.  But I find it worth noting that 
those who seem to desire an escape from some of the bonds of our 
written Constitution do not openly advocate its abandonment or change.  
Instead, they claim to be respecting it. 
ORIGINALISM: THE BETTER APPROACH 
Although alternatives to originalism are surprisingly hard to identify 
with any specificity, there is one very popular method that can be called 
the “underlying principles” approach.  We discern from the text the 
deeper underlying principles that underlie its particular injunctions.  We 
then appeal to these underlying principles to limit the scope of the text 
or ignore it altogether.  Those who employ this approach can claim that 
they are still enforcing the Constitution, in the sense that they are 
implementing the principles for which it stands.  The principal appeal of 
this approach is the possibility that it produces better results than can be 
produced by the written text. 
Allowing the underlying principles to substitute for or supercede the 
text, however, has its drawbacks.  For one thing, because the underlying 
principles are not themselves in writing and are often far from 
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incontestable, the principles may simply represent the preference of 
whoever is doing the “interpreting.”  Secondly, because the underlying 
principles, even if correct, are usually very abstract, how they are to be 
applied in particular cases can be very uncertain.  Does the principle of 
free expression supposedly underlying the right of freedom of speech 
lead one to support or oppose restrictions on paid political 
advertisements within 60 days of an election?  Although such 
restrictions take the form of restricting speech, perhaps they enhance 
freedom of expression by “leveling the playing field” and letting other 
voices be heard. 
If pretty much anyone can play this game to reach virtually any result, 
then the Constitution is no longer the source of law for law-makers.  
Instead, the real arbiters of government power are those in the courts 
who discern the underlying principles.  Everything then depends on who 
the Justices are, rather than on what the Constitution says.  Some root 
for Ginsberg or Stevens, others for Kennedy, still others for Scalia.  I 
think the judicial nomination and confirmation process we now see 
stems in part from a willingness to place the judges’ views of underlying 
principles ahead of what the Constitution actually says to reach arguably 
better results than can be reached by the text of the Constitution. 
The appeal of the underlying principles approach is two-fold.  First, 
the approach is plausible because we often do need to consider the 
principles underlying the text to make sense of it.  Does the Second 
Amendment protect the right to bear weapons, or the appendages to 
which our hands are attached?  Does its protections extend beyond 
ordinary bearable weapons that are used in legitimate self-defense, to 
side-winder missiles or nuclear weapons?  These questions cannot be 
asked without some appeal to what historical purpose the provision was 
supposed to serve. 
What is objectionable is when appeal to the underlying principles is 
used to ignore or trump the text.  If the principle underlying the Second 
Amendment is defined as contributing to public safety or even personal 
protection, some can then contend that with the emergence of 
government police forces and more lethal weapons, this purpose is best 
served by ignoring the right to keep and bear arms that is locked into the 
text.  In other words, where there is a will to do so, the technique can be 
as easily and almost always used to obviate rather than interpret the 
Constitution. 
The second appeal of the underlying principles approach is that it 
appears to yield better results than respecting the text and nothing but 
the text.  Its supporters point to particular cases we all accept today as 
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sacred.  Brown v. Board of Education37 is perhaps the most canonical of 
cases in the canon.  It is then claimed that, because the original meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot deliver the desired result, the 
meaning of the text must be changed by judges to something that is 
morally superior.  I would guess that this argument motivates the 
approach of ninety percent of constitutional law professors. 
There are three responses to this contention.  First, those who make 
this argument often strain to show why originalism cannot produce the 
same result because their real purpose is to refute originalism.  Very 
often a proper version of original meaning originalism offers support for 
results that present doctrine has a difficult time justifying.  As I explain 
in Restoring the Lost Constitution, the original meanings of the Ninth 
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause offer far more 
justifiable and robust protection of personal liberty, for example, than do 
current approaches based on the Due Process clauses.38 
Second, the underlying principles approach typically yield results that 
appeal to majorities when they are decided, but look decidedly inferior 
in hindsight.  In this category, I would put Dred Scott v. Sandford,39 
Plessy v. Ferguson,40 and Korematsu v. United States.41  In other words, 
superior results are supposed to justify an abandonment of original 
meaning in favor of appeals to underlying principles, but all that is truly 
guaranteed are results that are popular with some segment of the 
population when they are decided.  There is simply no guarantee that 
judges responding to popular sentiments will outperform the text of the 
original Constitution as it has been formally amended. 
Third, your political enemies can use the underlying principles 
approach to gut the provisions of the Constitution you care about when 
they get in power.  When they do, the only objection you can make is to 
their politics.  You cannot rightly complain about their method, or that 
they are violating the text of the written constitution, because they are 
simply doing what you would do.  If you do not like Justice Scalia’s 
underlying principles, you can hardly complain that he is disregarding 
the text of the Ninth Amendment, when you would ignore any text that 
contradicted the underlying principles you support. 
Given that we all care about the Constitution because we want a better 
rather than a worse society, the question is which approach is preferable.  
A system of nonoriginalist or faint-hearted originalist Justices enforcing 
 
 37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 38. See BARNETT, supra note 8. 
 39. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 41. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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the principles they find underlying the text of the Constitution and 
ignoring the text itself when it stands in the way of results of which they 
approve?  Or a consistent respect for the original meaning of the written 
Constitution as a whole? 
Given what this Constitution says, I choose the Constitution, but I can 
understand why those who disagree with what it says would prefer the 
Justices.  To them I can offer only two types of objections.  The first is 
to contest their claim that their system yields a better society than does 
reliance on the original meaning of the written Constitution as a whole.  
The second is to object that they are engaged in bait and switch.  While 
invoking “the Constitution” that is revered by the American people, they 
are really replacing it with their own visions of the principles they see 
underlying the text.  If they were candid about what they were doing, 
however, I doubt that this technique would be well received. 
CONCLUSION 
Does this defense of a fearless originalism by which the whole 
Constitution is enforced—including the original meaning of abstract 
clauses like the Ninth Amendment—lead to the sort of horrible results 
that, in part, leads Justice Scalia to be faint of heart?  I think not.  In my 
view, the original meaning of the entire Constitution, as amended, is far 
more felicitous than he apparently believes it to be.  But this is partly 
because I do not think the original meaning of the more general clauses 
is as limited he does.  In other words, an appropriate use of original 
meaning originalism leads to far fewer objectionable results than he 
thinks it will. 
In his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia anticipated and rejected this move.  
One way to avoid objectionable results, he observed, 
would be to say that it was originally intended that the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause would have an evolving content—that “cruel and 
unusual” originally meant “cruel and unusual for the age in question” and 
not “cruel and unusual in 1791.”  But to be faithful to originalist 
philosophy, one must not only say this but demonstrate it to be so on the 
basis of some textual or historical evidence.  Perhaps the mere words 
“cruel and unusual” suggest an evolutionary intent more than other 
provisions of the Constitution, but that is far from clear; and I know of no 
historical evidence for that meaning.  And if the faint-hearted originalist 
is willing simply to posit such an intent for the “cruel and unusual 
punishment” clause, why not for the due process clause, the equal 
protection clause, the privileges and immunity clause, etc.?  When one 
goes down that road, there is really no difference between the faint-
hearted originalist and the moderate nonoriginalist, except that the former 
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finds it comforting to make up (out of whole cloth) an original 
evolutionary intent, and the latter thinks that superfluous.42 
But here I think Justice Scalia misunderstands what originalism 
requires.  Indeed, here he appears to be reverting to original intent 
originalism when he asks whether “the mere words ‘cruel and unusual’ 
suggest an evolutionary intent.”  In contrast, original public meaning 
originalism attempts to identify the level of generality in which the 
Constitution is objectively expressed.  Does the text ban particular 
punishments of which they were aware, or does it ban all cruel and 
unusual punishments?  Does the text protect only enumerated rights, or 
does it also insist that other rights not be denied or disparage?  Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment protect a specific list of liberties debated at the 
time from infringement by states, or did it protect all “privileges or 
immunities of citizenship”?  Did the Second Amendment protect only 
such weapons as existed in 1789 or did it protect bearable “arms”? 
This is not to say, however, that the broader provisions of the text 
lack all historical meaning and are open to anything we may wish them 
to mean.  I do not know enough about the phrase “cruel and unusual” to 
comment knowledgeably on it, but I do know that the rights retained by 
the people was a reference to natural rights, which were conceived of as 
liberty rights.  That this was its public meaning at the time of its 
enactment is demonstrable.43  Similarly, the “privileges or immunities” 
in the Fourteenth Amendment was a reference both to natural liberty 
rights and the extra procedural protections of individuals provided by 
the Bill of Rights.44  Broad as both these provisions are, they are neither 
unlimited nor entirely open-ended. 
In sum, an originalist must take the whole text of the Constitution as it 
was written, whether rule-like or not.  That the founders and the authors 
of the Fourteenth Amendment drafted texts that leave some discretion in 
application to changing circumstances is not a bug.  It’s a feature.  
Applying the more abstract provisions of the text is required by a proper 
approach to originalism.  Justice Scalia fails to realize that original 
meaning originalism, properly understood, avoids many of the abhorrent 
results that caused him in his Taft Lecture to shrink from a fearless 
adherence to originalism. 
Of course, there is much more to be said about originalism than I have 
said here, some of which I have discussed at length elsewhere.  And I 
and other originalists have more work to do, both theoretically and 
 
 42. Scalia, supra note 1, at 861–862. 
 43. See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(2006). 
 44. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 60–66. 
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investigating original meaning.  But I hope I have shown first, that 
Justice Scalia’s faint-hearted commitment to originalism is not really 
originalism at all, either in theory or in practice.  Second, that adherence 
to original meaning originalism is warranted as an implication of a 
written constitution, a structural feature of our constitutional order that 
enhances its legitimacy.  Third, that the most prevalent alternative to 
originalism—an “underlying principles” approach—has its own serious 
drawbacks.  And finally that a fearless commitment to originalism might 
avoid rather than reach the horrible results that causes even so fearless a 
jurist of originalism to become faint of heart.  Because Justice Scalia 
places a higher priority on other considerations—such as 
majoritarianism and judicial restraint—I doubt this defense of 
originalism would change his mind.  But perhaps it will embolden others 
to venture where Justice Scalia fears to tread. 
